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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from a 
final order entered in the District Court on July 5, 2007, 
conditionally granting Appellee Robert Lark a writ of habeas 
corpus, vacating his Pennsylvania state court death sentence, 
and ordering the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to retry Lark 
within 180 days or release him.1  See Lark v. Beard, 495 F. 
Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Lark II”).  The Court granted the 
writ based on Lark’s claim that at his trial the Commonwealth 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
that the Supreme Court applied in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), when the Supreme Court reviewed a 
prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges in jury selection. 
 Appellants, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, and 
the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
(collectively “the Commonwealth”), filed a timely notice of 
                                                 
1 The District Court, at the unopposed request of the 
Commonwealth, issued an order on July 17, 2007, staying its 
conditional grant of habeas corpus relief pending the outcome of 
this appeal. 
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appeal from the Court’s order.  For the following reasons we 
will vacate the Court’s July 5, 2007 order and remand the case 
for further proceedings.  
 
 
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURE 
 
 We take the following facts from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s opinion affirming the denial of Lark’s first 
petition for state post-conviction relief:  
 
[I]n late 1978, Lark robbed Tae Bong Cho while 
putting a gun to the head of the victim’s infant 
child. He was apprehended shortly after the 
robbery and was charged with the crime. 
Approximately two months later, Lark murdered 
Mr. Cho in order to prevent him from testifying 
against Lark in the robbery trial. No witness was 
able to identify the killer, because he wore a ski 
mask. However, Lark bragged to a number of 
acquaintances that he had killed ‘the Korean.’ 
Lark failed to appear for trial on the robbery 
charge and he was convicted in absentia. 
Thereafter, Lark repeatedly threatened the 
prosecutor in the robbery case and detectives 
investigating the Cho homicide. He was captured 
on January 9, 1980 after he took a mother and her 
two small children hostage. While he was 
barricaded inside the hostage’s house, he told 
police: ‘I’ll kill you all like that [expletive] . . . I’ll 
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shoot you in the legs.’ 
Following capture, Lark was charged with 
offenses related to the murder of Mr. Cho, 
terroristic threats against the prosecutor in the 
robbery case, and the kidnapping of the woman 
and her two children. The first trial ended in 
mistrial as the result of an inadvertent question 
asked by the trial court . . . . 
 
Commonwealth v. Lark, 698 A.2d 43, 46 (Pa. 1997). 
 
 At his second trial, in 1985, Peter Rogers represented 
Lark, who is African-American, and assistant district attorney 
John Carpenter represented the Commonwealth.2  Voir dire 
lasted for four days.3  On June 7, 1985, the third day of voir 
dire, after Carpenter exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a 
female African-American juror, the following exchange 
occurred: 
 
Mr. Rogers: Your Honor, Before the other juror 
comes in, can we . . .  may the 
                                                 
2 Prior to his second trial, Lark moved to dismiss the charges 
against him on double jeopardy grounds.  The trial court denied 
the motion and the Pennsylvania Superior Court, on 
interlocutory appeal, affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Lark, 479 
A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).  
 
3 Jury selection actually began on June 4, 1985, but inasmuch as 
the Court did not make any selections on that day, we are 
concerned only with June 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1985. 
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records be preserved to indicate the 
racial composition of the jurors 
who are coming by so as to 
preserve an opportunity for me to 
make a challenge that the 
Commonwealth may in fact be 
excluding all blacks who come 
before this panel? Only way I can 
determine that is if I have the 
records made available to me.  Not 
today, Your Honor, but I just ask – 
The Court: What records are we talking about? 
Mr. Rogers: The records which will – that 
defense counsel doesn’t get a 
chance to see and I guess the 
Commonwealth doesn’t but I think 
it should indicate addresses, phone 
numbers, race, things like that, 
Your Honor. 
Mr. Carpenter:Judge– 
The Court: I don’t know that there’s any 
indication of race at all. 
Mr. Carpenter:My recollection is that– 
Mr. Rogers: As of this afternoon, Your Honor, 
he is striking all blacks. 
Mr. Carpenter:Oh.  How awful. 
 
App. at 611-12.  
 
The discussion between Rogers and the trial court 
continued with Rogers insisting that Carpenter was striking 
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blacks and asking the court to preserve a record of the race of 
the jurors.  The trial court responded by asserting that there was 
“nothing on the record as to who was white and who was black,” 
and that there was no way to determine the race of the jurors.  
Id. at 613.  Rogers stated that he wanted the records preserved 
only from the last jury panel and he was not arguing that 
Carpenter had exercised his peremptory challenges in a 
discriminatory manner during the prior two days of jury 
selection.  Carpenter stated, however, that he had not 
systematically excluded jurors, pointing out that there were three 
jurors on the panel of the same race as Lark.  The trial court, 
applying the law as it stood at the time of the trial, indicated that 
“neither one of [the attorneys] has to give any reason for 
[exercising a peremptory challenge].”  Id. at 614.  Ultimately, 
the trial court denied Rogers’ request, indicating that there was 
no record of the race of the jurors.  Rogers did not raise the 
equal protection peremptory challenge issue again. 
 On June 28, 1985, the jury returned a verdict finding 
Lark guilty of first-degree murder, possession of an instrument 
of crime, terroristic threats, and two counts of kidnapping.  In 
the penalty phase of the trial which followed, the jury found that 
there were no mitigating circumstances but that there was one 
aggravating circumstance--the murder of a state’s witness--and 
set the penalty at death.  The trial court denied all post-trial 
motions and imposed Lark’s death sentence on April 24, 1986.   
 On April 30, 1986, six days after the court sentenced 
Lark, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Batson v. Kentucky which lessened the burden of proof that 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965), had 
required for a defendant to show that a prosecutor engaged in 
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discriminatory jury selection.  One year later, that Court 
determined that the rule in Batson would apply retroactively to 
all cases pending on direct review at the time that it decided 
Batson.  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 
716 (1987).   
Lark filed a direct appeal from his conviction and 
sentence to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.4  On that appeal 
Lark, still represented by Rogers, did not raise a Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim based on 
Carpenter’s use of peremptory strikes during voir dire.  On May 
20, 1988, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Lark’s 
convictions and sentence.  Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 
491 (Pa. 1988).  Lark did not file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and thus the direct 
review of his conviction and sentence was completed on August 
18, 1988, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed his conviction.  See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.  Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as Lark’s direct appeal was pending at the time that 
the Supreme Court decided Batson, the rule in Batson is 
applicable to his case.5   
 After completion of Lark’s direct appeal the judicial 
                                                 
4 Under Pennsylvania law, all sentences of death are directly 
appealable to the state Supreme Court.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9711(h)(1) (West 1998); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 722 (West 
2004).  
 
5 Of course, the applicability of Batson is subject to the various 
jurisdictional and procedural rules that we discuss below. 
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proceedings in his case lay dormant as he did not file any further 
applications or motions until six years later when, in November 
1994, after the Governor of Pennsylvania signed a warrant for 
his execution, he sought a stay of execution in the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas.  That court denied Lark’s request for a 
stay on November 7, 1994, following which on November 8, 
1994, Lark filed a pro se motion in the District Court seeking an 
order staying his execution.  The District Court granted the stay 
to enable Lark to file a state post-conviction petition.6  
 On November 4, 1994, Lark filed his first Post 
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 9541 
et seq. (West 1989), petition in the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas.  After appointment of counsel, Lark filed an 
amended PCRA petition on February 8, 1995, raising 25 claims 
of trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel but the 
claims did not include an assertion that there had been a Batson 
violation.  The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition, 
and the PCRA court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, 
granted that motion.  Lark appealed from the dismissal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 In April 1997, while Lark’s appeal was pending in the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Philadelphia District 
Attorney’s Office released a video tape (the “McMahon tape”) 
                                                 
6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also issued a stay to permit 
the filing of a state post-conviction petition.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lark, Capital Appeal No. 77 (Pa. Nov. 10, 
1994) (unpublished order).  See Lark v. Beard, Civ. No. A 01-
1252, 2006 WL 1489977, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2006). 
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in which former assistant prosecutor Jack McMahon instructs 
his prosecutorial colleagues to exclude potential jurors on the 
basis of race, gender, occupation, and neighborhood.  On the 
tape that McMahon made after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Batson, he advised against striking all African-Americans and 
stated that his ideal jury would be composed of eight whites and 
four blacks.7  On July 1, 1997, Lark applied to the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania for a remand of his PCRA petition to 
allow him to assert a claim based on the McMahon tape.  On 
July 23, 1997, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the 
denial of post-conviction relief and on July 30, 1997, in a 
separate order, it denied Lark’s application for a remand.  
Commonwealth v. Lark, 698 A.2d at 52. 
 On August 29, 1997, Lark filed a second PCRA petition 
in the Court of Common Pleas.  In his second petition, Lark 
advanced several claims predicated on newly discovered facts, 
including a claim of discriminatory jury selection based on: (1) 
the McMahon tape; (2) the prosecutor’s allegedly discriminatory 
pattern of strikes; and (3) a report that Professors David Baldus 
and George Woodworth had authored on jury selection practices 
in Philadelphia capital cases from 1983-1993 (“the Baldus 
study”).  Lark requested discovery and an evidentiary hearing to 
present evidence regarding the racial makeup of the jurors that 
Carpenter had struck and his motivation for striking the jurors.  
Lark also sought the hearing to present evidence regarding the 
                                                 
7 For a more comprehensive discussion of the contents of the 
McMahon tape, see Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 656-58 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
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jury selection policies of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
office.  The PCRA court, without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, denied the petition as untimely because Lark filed the 
petition beyond the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 
PCRA petitions.  See 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b) (West 1998).   
On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Lark’s Batson claim was 
timely to the extent it was based on the McMahon tape because 
the facts underpinning that claim did not become available until 
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office released the tape in 
April 1997, and thus Lark’s Batson claim insofar as based on the 
McMahon tape came within the exception to the one-year 
deadline for filing PCRA petitions predicated on newly 
discovered facts.  See id. at § 9545(b)(ii); Commonwealth v. 
Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000).  The court, however, 
affirmed the PCRA court’s denial on the merits as it concluded 
that the contents of the McMahon tape did not demonstrate that 
Lark had made a prima facie showing that there had been 
discrimination in the jury selection at his trial.  Id. at 588-89.  
The court also held that the remaining bases for Lark’s Batson 
claims, namely the allegations arising from the race of each 
potential juror and the prosecutor’s “Oh.  How awful” statement 
at trial, were present at the inception of his trial and thus did not 
fall into an exception from the one-year rule in section 9545(b).8  
                                                 
8 In an alternative holding, the Supreme Court held that Lark 
waived these claims  because he did not raise them on direct 
appeal or in his first PCRA petition.  Inasmuch as the parties 
agreed in the District Court that the Supreme Court applied only 
the PCRA time bar and not the doctrine of waiver to deny 
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 While his appeal was pending from the denial of his 
second PCRA petition in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
Lark, in recognition of the possibility that if he did not act 
promptly the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s 
(AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations would preclude him 
from seeking federal relief, filed a habeas corpus petition in the 
District Court.  Lark admitted that his federal petition contained 
unexhausted claims that had been included in his second PCRA 
petition.  The District Court dismissed the petition without 
prejudice but ordered that the filing date that Lark filed another 
petition would relate back to the date of the filing of the 
dismissed habeas corpus petition.  See Lark v. Beard, Civ. No. 
A. 01-1252, 2006 WL 1489977, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2006) 
(“Lark I”).   
 On March 16, 2001, after the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Lark’s appeal, he timely filed another habeas 
corpus petition in the District Court, this time raising 15 claims.9 
                                                                                                             
Lark’s Batson claims, we will not discuss the Supreme Court’s 
waiver holding as a basis for procedural default.  Lark v. Beard, 
Civ. No. A 01-1252, 2006 WL 1489977, at *5 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 
May 23, 2006). 
  
9 The claims were: (1) The prosecutor used his peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner and as part of a 
discriminatory policy of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
Office, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments; (2) Trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt 
phase of the trial by failing to object to, and opened the door for, 
the admission of highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence; and 
 
 13 
                                                                                                             
he failed to investigate and present relevant and exculpatory 
evidence; (3) Trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing for 
failing to investigate, develop, prepare, or present available, 
relevant and compelling mitigating evidence regarding Lark’s 
childhood abuse; deprivations and mental health impairments; 
and gave an ineffectual closing argument in which he failed to 
ask the jury to find mitigating evidence; (4) The trial court erred 
in answering the jury’s question regarding the “meaning” of the 
death penalty in Pennsylvania; (5) Lark was forced to stand trial 
a second time in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, after the prosecutor intentionally goaded 
defense counsel into requesting a mistrial; (6) Lark is entitled to 
relief from his death sentence because the penalty phase jury 
instructions and verdict sheet indicated that the jury must find 
mitigating factors unanimously; (7) The trial court’s instructions 
on reasonable doubt at both phases of trial and on Lark’s burden 
of proof at the penalty phase were unconstitutionally erroneous; 
(8) Lark did not receive the meaningful “proportionality review” 
that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (West 1998) and 
federal constitutional law mandated; (9) Lark’s death sentence 
was the product of improper racial discrimination in violation of 
the U.S. Constitution; (10) The Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
policy of providing lodging and cash payments to witnesses 
violates the U. S. Constitution; (11) Lark was denied his right to 
an impartial jury and a fair trial when some jury members saw 
him in handcuffs; (12) The trial court denied Lark a fair and 
impartial trial because the voir dire failed to ensure that the 
jurors selected would consider the possibility of a life sentence; 
(13) The trial court violated Lark’s constitutional rights by 
refusing to sever unrelated criminal charges from his capital 
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 Lark filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on his habeas 
corpus petition but the Commonwealth objected to the granting 
of that hearing as it contended that he was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the Batson claim inasmuch as he failed to 
develop a factual record for that claim in the state court.  The 
Commonwealth also objected to the Batson claim on the 
grounds that it was unexhausted and procedurally defaulted 
inasmuch as Lark failed to comply with the PCRA’s one-year 
statute of limitations.  See 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b).    
In an order entered on May 23, 2006, the District Court 
held that Pennsylvania’s one-year statute of limitations for 
PCRA petitions was not in force at the time of Lark’s alleged 
default and, relying in part on our holding in Bronshtein v. 
Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005), held that the time bar was 
not an independent and adequate state law barrier to federal 
habeas corpus review of Lark’s claims.  Lark I, 2006 WL 
1489977, at *7.  In a related holding, the Court determined that, 
inasmuch as the PCRA court and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Lark’s request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant 
to the same one-year statute of limitations which it had found to 
be an inadequate state ground to bar habeas corpus relief, Lark 
had not failed to develop the factual basis of his Batson claim to 
the end that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) prevented the Court from 
                                                                                                             
murder trial and when it allowed evidence of Lark’s prior 
criminal activity to be introduced; (14) State court counsel was 
ineffective to the extent he failed to raise the claims Lark now 
raises; (15) Lark is entitled to relief from his conviction and 
sentence because of the prejudicial effects of the cumulative 
errors in his case.      
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exercising its discretion to grant him an evidentiary hearing.  
The Court also found that Lark alleged facts, which if proven 
true, would establish a prima facie showing that Carpenter 
exercised peremptory challenges based on race.  In particular, 
Lark alleged that Carpenter’s high strike rate of African-
American jurors, the absence of any race-neutral reasons for the 
strikes in the transcripts, and the trial prosecutor’s remark of 
“Oh.  How awful” in response to defense counsel’s comment 
that he was striking all the blacks from the jury, demonstrated a 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause violation.  
Finally, the Court exercised its discretion and granted Lark an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim of jury discrimination and 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and sentencing 
phases of his trial.10   
At the evidentiary hearing on November 8, 2006, the 
Commonwealth presented Carpenter’s testimony to answer the 
allegations that he struck jurors based on their race.  Carpenter 
testified that at the time of Lark’s trial he had been a prosecutor 
for ten years, and had not received formal training on jury 
selection practices, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office 
did not have formal rules about how to make peremptory strikes, 
and, although he knew Jack McMahon, that he did not take 
directions from him on how to pick a jury.  Apparently referring 
 
10 The Commonwealth has conceded that Lark’s trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating 
evidence in the penalty phase of the trial.  However, inasmuch 
as the Batson claim is the only issue before us on this appeal, we 
will not discuss the ineffective assistance of counsel claim any 
further.  
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to the time of the evidentiary hearing as McMahon did not make 
the tape until after Lark’s trial, he said that while he had heard 
of the McMahon tape he had never seen it and was not familiar 
with its contents.  Carpenter also stated that while he was aware 
that systematic exclusion of jurors based on race “wasn’t right” 
under the law at the time of the trial, he was unsure, prior to 
Batson, whether the law permitted a prosecutor to strike 
individual jurors on the basis of their race.  App. at 1021.   
Carpenter further testified that he remembered Lark’s 
trial because it was the only case in which he obtained a death 
sentence and because of his tense relationship with Rogers 
during the trial.  In preparation for his testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing, Carpenter reviewed the transcript of the 
voir dire but he could not recall much of that process and could 
not recall specific jurors.  Carpenter also reviewed the 
handwritten notes he took during jury selection, but they did not 
refresh his recollection of his reasons for his strikes of 
individual jurors and Carpenter testified that, while he used 
abbreviations and symbols, he was not systematic in his note-
taking.11 
                                                 
11 The record contains only Carpenter’s notes from the last two 
days of jury selection.  We note that even these records are 
incomplete as some jurors questioned in the transcript do not 
appear on Carpenter’s jury sheets.  On the third day of the voir 
dire Carpenter wrote letter symbols such as “A,” “D,” “H,” and 
“J,” as well as word notations.  On the fourth day, he used 
numbers corresponding to a key he placed at the bottom of the 
page.  Carpenter identified the letter “D” as corresponding to a 
possible bias in favor of the defendant.  He identified the symbol 
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The Commonwealth then questioned Carpenter about 
each of his individual peremptory strikes.  Except as to one 
juror, Charles Rabb, Carpenter had no independent or refreshed 
recollection of reasons for any of the peremptory strikes he 
exercised during Lark’s trial.  However, based on the 
circumstantial evidence that Carpenter provided, the District 
Court found that the Commonwealth had offered race-neutral 
reasons for every peremptory strike the Commonwealth 
questioned him about except for three jurors.  Inasmuch as the 
District Court later based its grant of the conditional writ on 
Carpenter’s failure to provide a race-neutral explanation for 
these three jurors, we will focus on those jurors in this appeal.  
However, we think it is important to recognize that, despite our 
focus on these three jurors, on remand the District Court may 
conclude at the third step of the Batson process that any one of 
Carpenter’s 13 peremptory strikes against African-Americans 
amounted to purposeful discrimination.   
The first juror Carpenter could not recall striking and 
could not provide circumstantial evidence for removing was 
Shirley Sampson, an African-American female, who was the 
subject of his first peremptory challenge.  Carpenter could not 
recall independently why he struck Sampson and when he read 
the transcript of her questioning his memory as to why he struck 
her was not refreshed.  Carpenter, however, unequivocally 
denied that he struck her because she was African-American and 
                                                                                                             
“H” as indicating juror hardship.  Although Carpenter could not 
recall what the letter “A” symbolized, he denied that he used 
that letter to denote a venireperson as an African-American.  
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averred that striking any juror because of his or her race was 
legally and morally abhorrent to him.   
Before proceeding to the next juror, the Commonwealth’s 
attorney asked Carpenter questions about his general jury 
selection practices.  Carpenter stated that the neighborhood 
where a potential juror lived was important because he did not 
want jurors who lived near the defendant or the place where the 
incident involved in the trial had occurred.  Though Carpenter 
indicated that he did not want a juror who lived too close to the 
defendant or who lived close to the crime scene, he did not state 
that he struck Sampson for either of these reasons.  Later, 
Carpenter testified that he took into account a potential juror’s: 
(1) employment status and nature of employment, as having a 
job showed that person had roots in the community but that he 
nevertheless did not want teachers or social workers on the jury; 
(2) a juror’s age, as older jurors were wiser and more 
responsible; (3) children, as Carpenter did not want jurors who 
had children who were the same age as the defendant; (4) home 
ownership, as a homeowner had a stake in the community; (5) 
hardship; (6) prior jury experience; (7) history as a victim of 
crime or a witness or defendant in a criminal case; (8) 
relationship with police officers, as Carpenter viewed jurors 
positively if they had family members who were police officers; 
(9) acquaintance with any potential witnesses in the trial; and 
(10) feelings about the death penalty.   
The second venireperson for whom Carpenter could not 
give a specific reason, or a reason based on circumstantial 
evidence, for striking was Florence Williams, also an African-
American female.  Carpenter could not find anything 
“particularly wrong” with Williams by looking at the trial 
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transcript.  Id. at 1044.  He, however, did state that there were 
other circumstances that might not appear in the transcript, 
“[f]or example, if I don’t like the juror, I think . . . it’s a good bet 
she doesn’t like me.” Id. at 1045.  When the District Court stated 
that “there could have been body language there,” Carpenter 
responded by saying “exactly.”  Id.   
As was the case with Williams, Carpenter could not 
recall a specific or circumstantial reason for striking the third 
juror, Edison Sisco,12 an African-American male.  Carpenter, 
however, noted that neither he nor defense counsel asked Sisco 
many questions.  When asked whether there was anything in the 
transcript which might indicate why he struck Sisco, Carpenter 
answered “No.  Except one thing he said was, when he was 
asked when [sic] was the last school he attended, he said 
Dobbins and then he said ‘No, Overbrook.’  I don’t know it 
looks like he – I don’t know.”  Id. at 1053.        
After the hearing, the parties filed two stipulations as to 
the race of potential jurors that Carpenter struck and seated on 
the jury.  The stipulated list of 29 persons included the race and 
gender of the selected jurors, the selected alternates, and the 
prospective jurors that Carpenter excused with peremptory 
challenges.  According to the stipulations, the jury in Lark’s 
case was composed of four African-Americans and eight 
Caucasians.  Carpenter did not exercise all of the peremptory 
                                                 
12 Although the District Court referred to this juror as “Edison 
Cisco,” the parties refer to him as “Edison Sisco,” and his name 
appears as Sisco on the juror sheets from the trial.  
We will adopt the parties’ spelling in this opinion. 
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strikes allotted to the prosecution and had five peremptory 
strikes remaining at the end of voir dire; however, out of the 15 
peremptory strikes Carpenter used, 13 were used to strike 
African-Americans.  Id. at 948-52.   
On July 3, 2007, the District Court granted the writ on the 
strength of the Batson claim, ordering the Commonwealth to 
retry Lark within 180 days or release him.  The Court examined 
Lark’s claim under the familiar three-step Batson analysis: 
First, a defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that a peremptory challenge has been 
exercised on the basis of race.   Second, if that 
showing has been made, the prosecution must 
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question.  Third, in light of the parties’ 
submissions, the trial court must determine 
whether the defendant has shown purposeful 
discrimination. 
 
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 
1035 (2003) (hereinafter “Cockrell”) (citations omitted).   
 
 As we indicated above, the District Court, in its May 23, 
2006 order holding that the one-year PCRA time bar was not an 
independent and adequate ground to bar Lark’s petition in that 
Court, determined that Lark met the first step of the Batson 
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inquiry.13  At the second step, the Court determined that because 
Carpenter could not articulate a race-neutral reason for his 
peremptory strikes of Sampson, Williams, and Sisco, the 
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of production.  The 
Court held that where the state fails to meet its Batson duty of 
production at step two, the analysis ends with a finding that 
there was a Batson violation.  The Court did not reach the issue 
of whether Lark’s reliance on the Baldus study and the 
McMahon tape to prove discrimination at the third step 
supported his Batson claim.14  The Commonwealth filed a 
timely notice of appeal challenging the Court’s conditional grant 
of the writ. 15 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 and 2254 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  The parties dispute the appropriate 
standard of review.  They agree that we exercise plenary review 
over the Court’s conclusions of law and review its factual 
                                                 
13 Actually in its May 23, 2006 opinion and order the District 
Court merely indicated that Lark made allegations satisfying the 
first Batson step. 
 
14 The District Court did not address any of Lark’s remaining 
guilt phase claims. 
 
15 The Commonwealth did not need a certificate of appealability 
to appeal.  See Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
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findings for clear error.  See Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 
713 (3d Cir. 2004).  But they differ with respect to the degree of 
deference that we must afford the Court’s finding of intentional 
discrimination in the jury selection process.   
Lark asserts that once a district court concludes that a 
petitioner has shown that there was intentional discrimination in 
the jury selection process, a court of appeals may not reject that 
determination unless the district court’s conclusion is shown to 
be clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 668-69 
(3d Cir. 2005).  The Commonwealth characterizes this approach 
as too simple and incorrect for use in this case, as it argues that 
the District Court predicated its finding of intentional 
discrimination on a misapplication of Batson’s legal principles.  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts that we exercise 
plenary review of the Court’s finding.   
 Lark’s citation of Wilson for the standard of review is 
misleading.  In Wilson, we upheld a district court’s factual 
finding of intentional discrimination at the third step of the 
Batson analysis.  Id. at 670.  But the district court based that 
finding on its credibility determination that the prosecutor acted 
with a discriminatory intent in exercising his peremptory strikes. 
 Id.  Here, the District Court did not base its decision on a 
credibility determination nor did it proceed to the third step of 
the Batson analysis.  Rather, the Court ruled that the 
Commonwealth did not offer any explanation for making the 
three peremptory strikes and, therefore, as a matter of law, it 
failed to meet its burden at step two of the Batson analysis.  But 
the Court’s approach here was problematic, for we have stated, 
“the Batson inquiry ends and the conviction must be vacated at 
the second stage of the analysis if the state’s explanation is such 
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that, taken at face value, it either demonstrates an equal 
protection violation or would otherwise be inadequate as a 
matter of law to support the conviction.”  Johnson v. Love, 40 
F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).  
Therefore, because the District Court did not indicate that 
Carpenter’s explanations at step two demonstrated an equal 
protection violation, the Court necessarily determined that 
Carpenter’s explanations for using peremptory challenges to 
strike Sampson, Williams, and Sisco were inadequate as a 
matter of law.  We will exercise plenary review over that legal 
conclusion.  See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 A. Timely Batson Objection  
 First, the Commonwealth argues that Lark did not make 
an adequate “Batson-style objection at trial,” and therefore, 
under our precedent, he is not entitled to relief on the Batson 
claim.  Appellant’s br. at 13.  Lark counters by asserting that the 
Commonwealth impermissibly is raising this argument on 
appeal for the first time.  In reply, the Commonwealth asserts 
that it raised the issue at several points in its original response to 
the petition.  Further, the Commonwealth argues that, inasmuch 
as we have held that a timely objection at trial is required to 
preserve a Batson claim, Lark has the burden to prove that he 
raised a timely Batson objection at trial and thus the 
Commonwealth did not need to raise the issue as an affirmative 
defense.  See Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 101-02 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
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 The Commonwealth argues that, in any event, in these 
habeas corpus proceedings it raised Lark’s failure to object by 
stating, in its response to Lark’s petition, that: (1) defense 
counsel “objected to, at most, four peremptory challenges which 
the prosecutor had made during the afternoon session of June 7, 
1985”; (2) “trial counsel did not specify the exact strikes to 
which he was objecting”; (3) “as a result of [Lark’s] dereliction 
in pursuing the Batson claim in state court, the record was not 
preserved”; (4) “[T]he record reflects that defense counsel told 
the court he had what he needed to make a record, but he never 
raised the subject again.”  Appellant’s reply br. at 5 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 These statements, however, did not put the District Court 
on notice of the legal argument that the Commonwealth now 
wishes to raise: that Lark’s objection at trial was not sufficient 
and timely and Lark therefore has waived the Batson claim for 
the purposes of federal habeas corpus review.16  See Bagot v. 
Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that the 
crucial question regarding waiver is whether the petitioner 
presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the 
district court).  It is unsurprising, therefore, that the District 
                                                 
16 In fact, as Lark points out, the Commonwealth consistently 
accepted the adequacy of Rogers’ objection in several 
documents submitted to the District Court.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth’s Memorandum of Law, Lark v. Beard, 01-cv-
1252, at 38 (“On June 7, 1985, petitioner objected to certain 
peremptory strikes of the prosecutor.”). 
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Court did not address this argument either in its May 23, 2006 
order granting an evidentiary hearing or in its July 3, 2007 order 
granting the conditional writ.  The Court only held that “Lark’s 
trial counsel, Peter Rogers, raised the issue of the 
Commonwealth’s improper peremptory strikes during the voir 
dire and sought to preserve a record of the racial composition of 
the jury.”  495 F. Supp. 2d at 492.   “As a general rule, we 
do not consider on appeal issues that were not raised before the 
district court.”  Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Comm’n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Nevertheless, in 
Appalachian States we noted that the enforcement of a waiver 
involves the exercise of discretion and thus the rule providing 
for waiver may be relaxed “whenever the public interest or 
justice so warrants.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  But even if we held that it was appropriate to relax the 
ordinary appellate review rule in order to consider the issue that 
the Commonwealth raises, i.e., that Lark did not make an 
adequate Batson objection at his trial, and we agreed with the 
Commonwealth that a defendant must make a timely Batson 
objection at trial to preserve a Batson issue and that the 
requirement that he do so cannot be waived, we would find that 
Lark made a timely objection at trial so as to preserve the 
Batson issue for later habeas corpus review.   
We have held that, even in trials before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Batson, a timely objection to the 
prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes is a prerequisite to 
raising a Batson claim on appeal.  Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d at 
102, citing Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 
2008), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Beard v. Abu-Jamal, 
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130 S.Ct. 1134 (2010).17  We explained that, “a timely objection 
of racial bias involving jury composition would have alerted the 
judge to errors that might be corrected in the first instance and 
given the judge the opportunity to develop a complete record of 
the jury selection process for appellate review.”  Abu-Jamal, 520 
F.3d at 282.  Thus, in Abu-Jamal the petitioner forfeited his 
Batson claim because he “did not object to the prosecutor’s use 
of peremptory challenges at any point during voir dire or at his 
1982 trial.”  Id. at 283-84.  Likewise, in Lewis we held that the 
petitioner’s statement of “So prejudiced.  So prejudiced,” and “I 
knew he would do that” after the prosecution’s use of 
peremptory strikes was not sufficient to alert the trial judge to a 
claim that the prosecution was striking venire members in a 
racially discriminatory manner.  Lewis, 581 F.3d at 102.   
 As was true for the petitioners in Lewis and Abu-Jamal, 
Lark’s trial was prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson 
and thus was at a time that Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 
S.Ct. 824, set forth the standard governing the review of the use 
of peremptory challenges.  In order to show a Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause violation under Swain, the 
defendant had “to show a pattern and practice of racial 
                                                 
17 On the remand from the Supreme Court we adhered to the 
result we reached in our vacated opinion and affirmed the 
district court’s order granting the petitioner habeas corpus relief 
to the extent that he had been sentenced to death in the state 
court.  Abu-Jamal v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 01-9014, 
____ F.3d. ____, 2011 WL 1549231 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2011).  
But our opinion on the remand does not affect the dispositions 
for which we cite our earlier opinion in that case in this opinion. 
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discrimination in jury selection across multiple prosecutions,” 
Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1996), but the 
prosecutor did not need to give reasons for the use of individual 
peremptory challenges to avoid a finding that there had been an 
equal protection violation.  See Swain, 380 U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. 
at 837.  An equal protection objection under Swain, however, 
“necessarily states an equal protection violation subject to proof 
under the Batson standard . . . .”  Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 
420, 111 S.Ct. 850, 856 (1991). 
Here it is clear that Rogers, Lark’s trial attorney, raised a 
timely objection to what he perceived was the prosecutor’s 
exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges.  At the trial 
on June 7, 1985, Rogers asked that: 
[T]he records be preserved to indicate the racial 
composition of the jurors who are coming by so 
as to preserve an opportunity for me to make a 
challenge that the Commonwealth may in fact be 
excluding all blacks who come before this panel? 
Only way I can determine that is if I have the 
records made available to me. 
   
App. at 611-12.   
Counsel later stated that “as of this afternoon, your honor, 
he is striking all blacks.”  Id. at 612.  The trial court refused to 
make a record as it stated that there was no way to determine a 
person’s race or color and that neither attorney had to explain 
his reasons for exercising peremptory challenges.  Rogers’ 
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statements that the prosecutor was striking all of the black jurors 
put the trial court on notice of Lark’s claim and distinguishes his 
case from Lewis and Abu-Jamal.  Specifically, Rogers timely 
pointed out what he perceived was the Commonwealth’s racially 
motivated peremptory strikes and he thus invited the trial court 
to develop a record on the issue for appellate review.  This 
notice was all that Abu-Jamal requires.  See Williams v. Beard, 
637 F.3d 195, 208 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011). 
The Commonwealth’s contentions that Rogers only made 
a “vague request for records,” did not ask the trial court to order 
Carpenter to explain himself, and only questioned the challenge 
of four jurors, do not demonstrate that Rogers did not make an 
objection at trial to the allegedly race based peremptory 
challenges.  Appellant’s reply br. 8-10 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  It would have been futile for Rogers to ask that 
Carpenter be required to explain the reason for his individual 
peremptory challenges or for Rogers to renew the objection 
when each African-American juror was excused for under the 
Supreme Court case law at the time of Lark’s trial, individual 
challenges in one case could not be the basis for finding that 
there had been an equal protection violation.18  See Swain, 380 
                                                 
18 The Commonwealth cites Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 
638 (2d Cir. 2001), for the proposition that a party must raise an 
objection in a manner that would allow a trial court to remedy 
the problem at trial.  Galarza is inapposite because the trial in 
that case occurred three years after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Batson.  Id. at 633. 
 
 
 
 29 
U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837.  Indeed, the trial court indicated as 
much when it stated that neither Carpenter nor Rogers had to 
explain the reasons behind individual peremptory strikes.     
We think it is also significant that even Carpenter 
recognized that Rogers was attempting to raise a Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection argument when Carpenter stated, 
referring to the Swain standard, that “there’s obviously not 
systematic exclusion when you’ve got 3 members out of 9 who 
are the same race as the defendant and his attorney.”  App. at 
616; see Swain, 380 U.S. at 227, 85 S.Ct. at 839.  Further, 
Rogers’ request for a record of the race of the jurors that 
Carpenter struck sought the type of evidence that would support 
(or refute) an equal protection violation under Swain.  See id. at 
223, 85 S.Ct. at 837 (“[W]hen the prosecutor in a county, in case 
after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and 
whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for 
the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified 
jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived 
challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve 
on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added 
significance.”).   
Therefore, even though Rogers’ statement that Carpenter 
was striking “all the blacks” from the jury and his request that 
the trial court make a record of the race of the jurors did not 
raise an objection with “the clarity that appropriate citations 
would have promoted,” his protest reasonably raised an equal 
protection claim under Swain.  Ford, 498 U.S. at 418, 111 S.Ct. 
at 855.  Thus, the objection was adequate to raise an equal 
protection claim under Batson.  Id. at 420, 111 S.Ct. at 856. 
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 Finally, the Commonwealth argues that, even if Lark 
properly objected to Carpenter’s peremptory strikes so as to 
raise an equal protection claim, the trial court’s rejection of that 
objection is entitled to deference.  It is true that in the habeas 
corpus context federal courts owe the same deference to implicit 
state court factual findings as they afford to explicit state court 
factual findings.  See, e.g., LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 
690, 692, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 1204 (1973) (per curiam); Campbell v. 
Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A]n implicit 
finding of fact is tantamount to an express one, such that 
deference is due to either determination.”).  Here, however, the 
trial court’s response that it was impossible to determine the 
race of the jurors and that counsel did not have to give reasons 
for peremptory challenges, clearly was a refusal to engage in an 
equal protection analysis rather than an implicit finding of fact 
entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).  Cf. 
Campbell, 209 F.3d at 289-90 (holding that state court made 
implicit credibility finding entitled to deference where court 
repeatedly stated that petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim had no legal merit); see also Coombs v. 
Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted) (“Where the state court fails to undertake a full step-
three analysis, as required by Batson, we will remand for the 
district court to engage in independent fact-finding.”).19   
                                                 
19 Of course, we do not fault the trial court for failing to engage 
in the three-step analysis at a time that the Supreme Court had 
not announced that a court should engage in that analysis.  
However, the trial court, by refusing to make a record of the 
race of the struck jurors, failed even to undertake or at least 
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In sum, even though Lark did not present his equal 
protection claim with great clarity at the trial we will not reject 
his Batson claim on the basis that he failed to advance a timely 
Batson objection at trial. 
 B. Procedural Default 
   We next consider whether Lark procedurally defaulted 
his Batson claim by failing to advance it properly in the 
Pennsylvania courts.  There has been a procedural default when 
“a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims 
because the prisoner failed to meet a state procedural 
requirement.”  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 
S.Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991).  As a matter of comity and federalism, 
a federal court may not conduct habeas corpus review of a claim 
which a petitioner has procedurally defaulted in state court.  
Federal review, however, is available if the procedural rule that 
the state court applied to bar a federal claim was not 
“independent” and “adequate.”  See Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 
103, 115 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).  A state 
procedural rule is an inadequate ground to bar federal review if 
it was not firmly established and regularly followed by the state 
courts at the time it was applied.  Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 707.  
Whether a procedural rule “was firmly established and regularly 
applied is determined as of the date the default occurred, and not 
as of the date the state court relied on it, because a petitioner is 
entitled to notice of how to present a claim in state court.”  
Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 115 (internal citations omitted).  
                                                                                                             
initiate an analysis under the standard then in effect under 
Swain.  
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Lark first attempted to raise a specific claim under Batson 
when he unsuccessfully sought an order from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court remanding his PCRA petition to the PCRA court 
so that he could raise a Batson claim.  Thereafter Lark filed a 
second PCRA petition in 1997 raising a Batson violation as a 
ground for relief and requesting that the court grant him an 
evidentiary hearing to present proof of the race of the 
venirepersons at his trial and to enable him to advance the 
McMahon tape in support of his claim.  The PCRA court, 
without holding an evidentiary hearing, dismissed the petition as 
untimely under the PCRA deadline set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 9545(b).  
 On appeal from the dismissal of the second PCRA 
petition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked section 
9545(b)(1)(ii)20 to hold that the petition so far as it asserted a 
Batson claim was timely but only to the extent that Lark 
predicated the claim on the McMahon tape.  746 A.2d at 588.  
Thus, the court held that it could not review the Batson claim to 
the extent Lark predicated it on the Baldus study, the 
prosecutor’s “Oh.  How awful,” statement, and the race of the 
potential jurors inasmuch as those aspects of the claim were 
ascertainable more than one year before Lark filed his second 
PCRA petition, and a Batson claim on any of these three bases 
did not fall within the exception set forth in section 
                                                 
20 Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) provides that a claim is not untimely if 
“the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise of due diligence.” 
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9545(b)(1)(ii).  Id. at 589.  On the merits, the court held that the 
McMahon tape was not sufficient to establish a policy of 
discrimination by the prosecutors in the Philadelphia District 
Attorney’s Office.  Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 
A.2d 435, 443 n.10 (Pa. 1999)). 
  As we recently discussed in Morris v. Beard, 633 F.3d 
185 (3d Cir. 2011), the PCRA one-year statute of limitations in 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b) was not firmly established and 
regularly followed prior to 1998: 
In Bronshtein, we explained that the PCRA’s one-
year statute of limitations was not an adequate 
state bar to federal habeas review of claims 
defaulted prior to, at the very least, October 20, 
1998. [Bronshtein, 404 F.3d] at 709. Before that 
date, Pennsylvania courts frequently applied a 
‘relaxed waiver’ rule in capital cases.  Id.  In other 
words, courts refused to enforce procedural rules-
-such as the PCRA’s one-year statute of 
limitations--in capital cases because of the 
‘overwhelming public interest in preventing 
unconstitutional executions.’ Id. at 708 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 
A.2d 174, 180-81 (Pa. 1978)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Although a trio of Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court decisions in 1998 and 1999 
interred the relaxed waiver doctrine, see, e.g, 
Commonwealth v. Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 726 A.2d 
374 (Pa. 1999), we observed in Bronshtein that it 
was not clear that the rule would be unavailable as 
of October 20, 1998--the date of Bronshtein’s 
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default. See 404 F.3d at 709-10. Because the 
PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations ‘was not 
firmly established and regularly followed’ as of 
that date, we held it was an inadequate state bar to 
federal habeas review of Bronshtein’s claims.  Id. 
 
Morris, 633 F.3d at 191. 
 Here, the default in the timeliness of the filing of Lark’s 
second PCRA petition was on January 16, 1996,21 or the 
effective date of the PCRA time bar, at a time that the PCRA 
one-year time bar was not firmly established due to the 
                                                 
21 The District Court set the default date as August 18, 1989, or 
one year after completion of the direct appeal in Lark’s case, but 
that date fails to account for the statutorily created one-year 
grace period for filing PCRA petitions where, as here, the 
judgment of sentence became final before the effective date of 
the time bar, or January 16, 1996.  See Commonwealth v. 
Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. 1998).  Lark’s first PCRA 
petition, filed in 1994 and thus before the one-year deadline, 
was not subject to the one-year deadline.  Inasmuch as the grace 
period does not apply to second or subsequent petitions, the date 
of default for the second petition is the effective date of the time 
bar or January 16, 1996.  See Commonwealth v. Crawley, 739 
A.2d 108, 109 (Pa. 1999).  As a matter of law, however, the 
error has no consequence on this appeal because the relaxed 
waiver rule was followed in Pennsylvania until after the default 
here.  
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s “relaxed waiver” rule. 22  
Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 708 (citing Commonwealth v. 
McKenna, 383 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1978)).  Therefore, as we held in 
Bronshtein and most recently re-affirmed in Morris in a similar 
situation, the one-year PCRA time bar cannot justify a federal 
court determination that Lark’s Batson claim has been 
procedurally defaulted.  
  The Commonwealth argues that the state time-bar rule 
was an adequate basis to find that Lark had procedurally 
defaulted his Batson claim because he had notice of the time bar 
which the Pennsylvania General Assembly made explicitly 
applicable to capital cases and, further, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court never applied the relaxed waiver rule to the time 
bar.  But our reasoning in Bronshtein refutes these arguments 
and we have reaffirmed the Bronshtein reasoning in subsequent 
cases and, therefore, we need not address the Commonwealth’s 
arguments any further.23  See Morris, 633 F.3d at 195; Holland 
v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2008).   
In holding that the time bar was not an independent and 
                                                 
22 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court since has made it clear that 
it no longer would relax procedural requirements in capital 
cases.  See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 251 n.12  
(3d Cir. 2002). 
 
23 The Commonwealth seems to acknowledge this point, stating 
that it was including the procedural default argument in order to 
preserve the issue for “possible en banc or  
Supreme Court review.”  Appellant’s br. at 34. 
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adequate state ground for denying relief for purposes of a later 
procedural default analysis in a federal district court, we have 
considered the two most recent Supreme Court decisions 
addressing the adequate and independent state rule doctrine, 
Walker v. Martin, 131 S.Ct. 1120 (2011), and Beard v. Kindler, 
130 S.Ct. 612 (2009).  In Kindler, the Court considered a very 
narrow question not implicated here: whether a state procedural 
ground is automatically inadequate and unenforceable on federal 
habeas corpus review because the state procedural rule is 
discretionary rather than mandatory.  Id. at 614-15.24  Similarly, 
in Walker the Court held that California’s judge-made rule that a 
state habeas corpus petition “should be filed as promptly as the 
circumstances allow . . .” is an independent and adequate state 
rule for purposes of procedural default.  Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 
1125 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Court 
held that the California rule, though discretionary, met the 
“firmly established” criterion because the California courts’ 
application of the rule in particular circumstances supplied the 
requisite clarity for habeas corpus petitioners.  Id. at 1128.  
                                                 
24 Kindler vacated our decision in Kindler v. Horn, 542 F.3d 70 
(3d Cir. 2008), in which we held that the Pennsylvania fugitive 
forfeiture doctrine pursuant to which the petitioner’s conviction 
was affirmed did not provide an adequate basis to bar federal 
habeas corpus review.  On the remand from the Supreme Court 
we adhered to our prior result on the ground that the 
Pennsylvania courts rather than applying a discretionary rule 
“applied a mandatory rule that represented a break from past 
decisions.”  Kindler v. Horn, No. 03-9010,____ F.3d ____, 
____, 2011 WL 1602083, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 29, 2011). 
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Further, the rule was “regularly followed” even though at times 
the California courts bypassed the rule and summarily dismissed 
petitions on the merits.  Id. at 1129. 
  The Supreme Court’s holdings in Walker and Kindler 
have not affected our holding in Bronshtein that prior to 1998 
capital petitioners in Pennsylvania could rely on state courts to 
relax procedural rules, including the one-year PCRA time bar.  
Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 709.25  Both Walker and Kindler 
concerned discretionary and independent state procedural rules 
which state courts consistently applied to bar federal claims.  In 
contrast, Pennsylvania’s PCRA time bar is a facially mandatory 
state procedural rule which was not clearly followed in capital 
cases at the time of Lark’s state court default due to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s judicially created doctrine of 
“relaxed waiver.”  See, e.g.,  Bostick v. Stevenson, 589 F.3d 
160, 165 n.6 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We do not read Kindler to apply 
to facially mandatory rules that state courts nonetheless apply 
arbitrarily.”).  Indeed, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
own recognition, the “relaxed waiver” rule “virtually eliminated 
any semblance of finality in capital cases . . . .” Commonwealth 
v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (Pa. 1998).  Thus, it cannot be 
argued plausibly that the PCRA time bar regularly was followed 
or firmly was established at the time of Lark’s procedural 
default in 1996.  
 C. District Court Evidentiary Hearing  
                                                 
25 In any event, as we noted above, we applied Bronshtein’s rule 
after the Supreme Court decided Kindler.  See Morris, 633 F.3d 
at 195. 
 
 38 
 The Commonwealth argues that, even assuming Lark’s 
Batson claim is not procedurally defaulted, the District Court 
should not have held an evidentiary hearing on the claim 
inasmuch as Lark was not sufficiently diligent in pursuing his 
Batson claim in state court as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires.  
Section 2254(e)(2) provides that,  
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual 
basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the 
court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
claim unless the applicant shows that –  
 
(A) the claim relies on— 
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable; or 
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have 
been previously discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence; and 
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be 
sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense.  
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 
 The Supreme Court has held that a failure to develop the 
factual basis of a claim in the opening clause of section 
2254(e)(2) “is not established unless there is lack of diligence, 
or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the 
prisoner’s counsel.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432, 120 
S.Ct. 1479, 1488 (2000).  The Court distinguished the diligence 
requirement of the opening clause of section 2254(e)(2) from the 
diligence requirement of section 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) by explaining 
that the latter refers to cases in which the facts underlying a 
claim could not have been discovered through due diligence 
while the former asks only whether “the prisoner made a 
reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the 
time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court . . . .”  Id. at 
435, 120 S.Ct. at 1490.   
 Thus, there is a separate fault requirement in the opening 
clause of section 2254(e)(2) which asks whether the petitioner 
adequately and diligently pursued the factual basis of his claim 
in state court.  If the petitioner fails in this regard and is 
therefore “at fault,” the bar to relief in section (e)(2) is raised.  
Otherwise, if the petitioner is not “at fault,” the court may 
exercise its discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.  See 
Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287 (stating that if section 2254(e)(2) 
does not bar an evidentiary hearing, federal courts have 
discretion to grant a hearing with the potential to advance the 
petitioner’s claim).  Here, the District Court held that because 
the state court denied Lark’s request for an evidentiary hearing 
based on an inadequate procedural rule, Lark did not fail to 
develop the Batson claim and section 2254(e)(2) did not bar a 
hearing in that Court.  See Morris, 633 F.3d at 194-95 (citing 
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Wilson, 426 F.3d at 665).  The Court, after finding section 
2254(e)(2) inapplicable, exercised its discretion to grant Lark an 
evidentiary hearing.    
 The Commonwealth contends that the District Court 
improperly conflated diligence and procedural default.  In 
Wilson we stated that the procedural default doctrine and section 
2254(e)(2)’s diligence requirement analytically were linked: “If 
a petitioner requests a hearing to develop the record on a claim 
in state court, and if the state courts . . . deny that request on the 
basis of an inadequate state ground, the petitioner has not ‘failed 
to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court 
proceedings’ for the purposes of § 2254(e)(2).”  Wilson, 426 
F.3d at 665.  Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argues that the 
diligence standard sets a different and higher bar than the 
procedural default doctrine and dismissal on the basis of an 
inadequate procedural rule does not excuse years of dilatoriness 
in state court.  The Commonwealth also argues that Wilson is 
distinguishable because McMahon himself prosecuted the 
petitioner in that case and the petitioner could not have brought 
the claim earlier because the tape was the “centerpiece” of his 
Batson claim.  Id. at 666 n.11.  As the Commonwealth is quick 
to point out, Lark was aware of the factual predicates of his 
Batson claim – the pattern of the prosecution’s strikes, the race 
of the jurors, and the prosecutor’s statement – as early as his 
trial counsel’s objection during the jury selection process of his 
case. 
 The Commonwealth makes a strong argument, 
particularly inasmuch as the years of delay between the District 
Court evidentiary hearing and the trial greatly prejudiced its 
ability to respond to the Batson claim.  As the Supreme Court  
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has noted, the principles of comity and federalism underlie the 
diligence requirement: 
Comity . . . dictates that when a prisoner alleges 
that his continued confinement for a state court 
conviction violates federal law, the state courts 
should have the first opportunity to review this 
claim and provide any necessary relief.  For state 
courts to have their rightful opportunity to 
adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be 
diligent in developing the record and presenting, 
if possible, all claims of constitutional error. 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 437, 120 S.Ct. at 1490-91 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  
It is undoubtedly reasonable to argue that Lark’s failure 
to raise the Batson claim on direct appeal followed by his 
inaction for six years before filing a post-conviction petition, 
which even then did not raise a Batson claim, demonstrated that 
he did not make a “diligent search for evidence.”  Id. at 435, 120 
S.Ct. at 1490.  Moreover, Rogers, who was Lark’s counsel on 
his direct appeal as well as at trial, was clearly aware of a 
potential discriminatory jury selection claim for, as we have 
discussed, he raised an objection to the prosecution’s strikes 
during voir dire.  Thus, though the McMahon tape and the 
Baldus study may not have alerted Lark to a possibility of there 
having been a “culture of discrimination” 26 in the Philadelphia 
                                                 
26 The District Court noted that the McMahon tape “could 
conceivably reflect a culture of discrimination that is relevant to 
. . . Lark’s Batson/Swain claim.” Lark I, 2006 WL 1489977, at 
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District Attorney’s Office until after his trial and direct appeal in 
this case, see Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 347, 123 S.Ct. at 1045, we 
reject Lark’s argument that he could not have been aware of his 
Batson claim given the information available at the time of his 
direct appeal and we also reject his argument that he could not 
have discovered the claim through the exercise of a reasonable 
investigation.  Cf. Williams, 529 U.S. at 439-40, 120 S.Ct. at 
1492 (holding that petitioner failed to develop facts of Brady 
claim where counsel was a aware of psychiatric report but failed 
to investigate in anything but a “cursory manner”).  After all, the 
jury selection process took place in front of him.  Moreover, 
inasmuch as a Batson claim, unlike a Swain claim, can be 
proven by the facts in a single case relating to jury selection, 
Lark did not need “culture of discrimination” materials to 
establish his claim. 
 We nevertheless reject the Commonwealth’s arguments 
regarding the delay in this case because, after the 
Commonwealth submitted its brief on this appeal but before the 
oral argument, we rejected an almost identical argument in 
Morris.  In that case, the petitioner, Kelvin Morris, was 
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 
Pennsylvania state court.  After he filed an unsuccessful direct 
appeal and an unsuccessful PCRA petition, Morris filed a 
second PCRA petition in which he raised, for the first time, a 
claim that his trial attorney’s representation of his brother, Artie 
                                                                                                             
*8 n.15.  We, however, since have held that a district court did 
not clearly err in finding that the McMahon tape did not create a 
culture of discrimination in the Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
Office.  Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir. 2008).    
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Morris, in a civil suit created a conflict of interest that deprived 
Morris of effective assistance of counsel in his criminal trial.  
Morris, 633 F.3d at 190.  The PCRA court dismissed the second 
petition without holding an evidentiary hearing for the sole 
reason that Morris filed the petition beyond the PCRA’s one-
year statute of limitations.  Id.  Morris then filed a federal 
habeas corpus petition raising the same claim and requesting an 
evidentiary hearing.  The Commonwealth, as it does in this case, 
argued that, because of the lengthy delay and the timing of 
Morris’ claim,27 section 2254(e)(2) barred the district court from 
holding an evidentiary hearing.   
 Inasmuch as the petitioner in Morris and Lark are in 
almost identical procedural postures, we will quote from our 
opinion in Morris at length: 
One might argue that [Morris’] failure to comply 
with the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations 
means that he did not seek a hearing ‘in the 
manner prescribed by state law.’ Williams, 529 
U.S. at 427, 129 S.Ct. at 1485-86. But such an 
argument runs headlong into our holding in 
Bronshtein, where we observed that the PCRA’s 
time bar was neither ‘firmly established’ nor 
‘regularly followed’ at the time [Morris] filed his 
second PCRA petition. 404 F.3d at 709-10. 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding 
Pennsylvania’s use of the ‘relaxed-waiver rule’ at 
that time, it was effectively impossible for 
                                                 
27 Morris filed the claim 13 years after the trial and one month 
after his brother died. 
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[Morris] to fail to comply with Pennsylvania law 
on statute of limitations grounds when filing his 
second PCRA petition. In Williams, the Supreme 
Court explained that a finding of diligence would 
turn on whether a petitioner ‘made a reasonable 
attempt’ to pursue his claim ‘in light of the 
information available at the time.’ 529 U.S. at 
435, 129 S.Ct. at 1490. With no ‘firmly 
established and regularly applied rule’ clearly 
barring [Morris’] lengthy delay, Bronshtein, 404 
F.3d at 708, his belated hearing request was an 
acceptable attempt to pursue his claim in light of 
the information available to him at the time of 
filing. Because the Pennsylvania state courts 
failed to hold a hearing and rule on [Morris’] 
conflict-of-interest claim ‘for some reason 
unrelated to [his] diligence, § 2254(e)(2) [does] 
not apply and a new evidentiary hearing [is] 
permitted.’ Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 436 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
As the Commonwealth correctly argues, 
merely because a petitioner has complied with 
state law when seeking an evidentiary hearing 
does not mean that he has been diligent for 
purposes of § 2254(e)(2). The jurisdictional 
standard for procedural default of § 2254(a) and 
the evidentiary hearing standard of § 2254(e)(2) 
are distinct provisions that will frequently require 
separate analyses. But where, as here, a state court 
gives no reason for denying a petitioner’s hearing 
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request other than his failure to comply with a 
subsequently invalidated state statute of 
limitations, we cannot say that the petitioner was 
not diligent for purposes of § 2254(e)(2). 
Accordingly, we hold that § 2254(e)(2) did not 
prohibit the District Court from conducting an 
evidentiary hearing on [Morris’] conflict-of-
interest claim. 
 
Morris, 633 F.3d at 195-96 (emphasis added). 
  In a letter filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), the 
Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Morris by arguing that 
the rule we established in that case was the following: “where a 
petitioner had the opportunity and forum to litigate the merits of 
the claim in state court, but failed to do so, he is not diligent 
under [section] 2254(e)(2) even though his later attempt to raise 
the again [sic] is barred by an inadequate rule.”  Appellant’s 
28(j) letter dated January 31, 2011, at 1-2.  But as the excerpted 
portion above demonstrates, this is a misstatement of Morris’ 
holding.  Rather, the holding in Morris was that section 
2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary hearing for lack of 
diligence where the only reason a state court gives for denying 
an evidentiary hearing is a subsequently invalidated state 
procedural rule.  This is exactly what happened in Lark’s case. 28 
                                                 
28 We are also unconvinced by the Commonwealth’s attempt to 
distinguish Morris on the ground that the conflict of interest 
claim in that case, unlike Lark’s Batson claim, occurred outside 
the courtroom and thus the inadequate state procedural rule 
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 Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s reliance on our 
opinion in Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007), is 
unconvincing.  In Taylor, the petitioner obtained an evidentiary 
hearing during his first PCRA hearing and, after the PCRA court 
denied the claim, unsuccessfully sought to present new expert 
witnesses testimony in a second PCRA petition raising the same 
claim.  We affirmed the district court’s denial of the request for 
an evidentiary hearing under section 2254(e)(2) despite the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s dismissal of Taylor’s second 
PCRA petition pursuant to an inadequate state procedural 
ground: “Unlike the petitioner in Wilson, Taylor’s competency 
claim was raised in his first PCRA petition and addressed on the 
merits.  His resurrection of the claim in his second PCRA 
petition does not put it under Wilson’s rule.”  Id. at 436-37.  The 
procedural posture of Lark’s case differs from that of the 
petitioner in Taylor inasmuch as Lark is not attempting to get 
two bites at the apple by requesting a district court hearing to 
present new evidence which was available at the time of his 
state court evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 437 (“The only thing that 
prevented Taylor from presenting his new evidence of 
incompetency before the first PCRA court was a lack of 
diligence.”).  Rather, Lark is requesting a hearing because the 
state court prevented him from presenting his evidence in the 
first instance by the application of an inadequate procedural 
rule.  In that respect, Lark’s request, to the extent that his Batson 
                                                                                                             
prevented Morris from presenting evidence in the only forum 
available to him.  This rationale clearly was not the basis for our 
holding in Morris. 
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claim is based on the Commonwealth’s pattern of discriminatory 
strikes, falls squarely within Morris’ holding and, therefore, we 
find that section 2254(e)(2) did not prevent the District Court 
from granting him an evidentiary hearing on his Batson claim. 
 D. Merits of Lark’s Batson Claim 
 1. The AEDPA 
 We can understand why by this time a reader of this 
opinion would wonder whether we ever would reach the 
substantive issue on this appeal, i.e., did the District Court 
correctly grant Lark habeas corpus relief leading to his release 
or a new trial?  But our long discussion of the procedural and 
jurisdictional issues was necessitated by the remarkable 
complexity of the law governing habeas corpus petitions which 
to a large extent is the result of the interaction of state and 
federal law inherent in our dual sovereignty system.  In fact, 
solving the procedural and jurisdictional issues before we could 
reach the substantive issues on this appeal was a process much 
like solving Rubik’s cube.  But we now reach the merits issue on 
this appeal.   
 Pursuant to the AEDPA, where a state court adjudicates 
the merits of a petitioner’s claim, federal courts review the claim 
under a highly deferential standard.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
& (2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).  As we 
have indicated, Lark properly presented the Batson claim based 
on the Commonwealth’s pattern of jury strikes to the state courts 
in his second PCRA petition, but the state courts rejected that 
claim largely pursuant to what clearly was a state procedural 
rule inadequate to bar federal habeas corpus review.  When, as 
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here, the state courts do not adjudicate a claim on the merits, and 
that claim is presented properly to a federal court in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, the deferential standards of the 
AEDPA do not apply.  See Coombs, 616 F.3d at 260 (citing 
Holloway, 355 F.3d at 718).  Therefore, for the most part a 
federal habeas corpus court considering Lark’s Batson claim 
based on the Commonwealth’s pattern of jury strikes should 
exercise de novo review.   Coombs, 616 F.3d at 261.  On the 
other hand, to the extent that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
rejected Lark’s Batson claim that he predicated on the 
McMahon tape on the merits we will assume that its decision is 
entitled to deferential review.  But that possibility is of no 
consequence on this appeal as the District Court did not rely on 
the McMahon tape to reach its conclusion and we are 
predicating our result on our determination that as a matter of 
federal law the District Court misapplied Batson.  Accordingly, 
our review is entirely de novo. 
 2. Batson Three-Step Analysis. 
 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory 
challenge to strike a prospective juror solely on account of 
race.”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 719 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 
106 S.Ct. 1712).  But “[a]s in any equal protection case, the 
burden is . . . on the defendant who alleges discriminatory 
selection of the venire to prove the existence of purposeful 
discrimination.”  Coombs, 616 F.3d at 261 (quoting Batson, 476 
U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We have held that the exclusion of even one vernireperson from 
the jury based on race requires that, under Batson, there be a 
new trial.  See Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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 As we stated earlier, typically the adjudication of a 
Batson violation proceeds in three steps: (1) the defendant must 
make a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised a 
peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner; (2) once the 
defendant makes that prima facie showing, the prosecutor must 
offer a race-neutral reason for having exercised the challenge; 
(3) the trial court, weighing the parties’ submissions, determines 
whether the prosecution’s strike amounted to purposeful 
discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 328-29, 123 
S.Ct. at 1035.  In this three-step process the prosecution has the 
burden of production of the race-neutral reason for the strike at 
the second step, but the burden of persuasion never shifts from 
the opponent of the peremptory strike.  See Purkett v. Elem, 514 
U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam).         
 The Commonwealth argues that we should not use the 
Batson three-step burden shifting procedure when making an 
analysis many years after the trial because the use of the 
procedure at that time is unfairly advantageous to the petitioner 
and greatly prejudicial to the Commonwealth.  But our 
precedent clearly requires that we reject that argument.  See, 
e.g., Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(applying three-step test in pre-Batson case where defense 
attorney did not object until after voir dire was completed); 
Love, 40 F.3d at 667 (applying three-step Batson analysis in a 
post-trial context).   
 Certainly, when the Supreme Court developed Batson’s 
burden-shifting framework, it envisioned that, inasmuch as a 
timely objection would permit a prosecutor to explain use of the 
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challenges, a defendant would make an objection at trial to what 
he regarded was the prosecutor’s racially based use of 
peremptory challenges.  After all, as the Commonwealth argues, 
applying the burden shifting method several years after the trial 
makes it more difficult for the prosecution to provide a race-
neutral explanation for peremptory strikes.  Appellant’s br. at 
37-38 citing Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 875-86 (8th Cir. 
1998) (holding that it is inappropriate to apply Batson’s burden 
shifting where there has been a long delay between jury 
selection and the filing of the claim, a voir dire record is not 
available, and the petitioner did not raise a timely objection); 
McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1251 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(stating in dicta that where a Batson objection was raised over 
three months after trial, petitioner was not entitled to benefit of 
burden shifting rule).29  Indeed, one reason that the Supreme 
                                                 
29 Of course we recognize that in both McCrory and Henderson, 
unlike in this case, the defendants did not raise objections to the 
prosecutor’s discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges at 
their respective trials and, further, the voir dire was not recorded 
in either case. Carter, 151 F.3d at 873; McCrory, 82 F.3d at 
1245.  However, like the defendants in those cases, Lark did not 
raise a Batson claim until after the trial, and thus, in light of the 
passage of time between the voir dire and the time when a court 
first adjudicated the merits of the Batson claim, the prosecutor’s 
faded memory rendered the three-step process analysis much 
more difficult for both Lark and the Commonwealth.  See 
Holloway, 355 F.3d at 726 (explaining that a 17-year delay 
between trial and appellate review of a Batson claim “is 
certainly regrettable both for the Commonwealth and for 
Holloway . . . .”). 
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Court applied Batson retroactively only in cases pending on 
direct review at the time that it decided Batson was the difficulty 
in applying Batson long after the trial.  See Allen v. Hardy, 478 
U.S. 255, 260-61, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 2881 (1986) (per curiam) 
(declining to hold Batson applicable to cases pending on 
collateral review when the Court decided Batson).   
 In recognition of the delay problem, we realize that it is 
one thing to apply Batson in the adjudication of a direct appeal 
that was pending when the Supreme Court decided that case but 
quite a different matter to apply it in a collateral proceeding 
many years later merely because a direct appeal had been 
pending in the case under review when the Supreme Court 
decided Batson.  Thus, it is not surprising that we have a line of 
cases, discussed more extensively below, which provide 
guidance on how to approach a prosecutor’s faded memory in 
the adjudication of Batson claims brought years after trial.  But 
even in cases of delay in the assertion of a Batson claim, we 
never have adopted the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning that, in order to obtain Batson relief, a petitioner has 
to show “purposeful discrimination” outside of an ordinary 
burden shifting analysis.  Carter, 151 F.3d at 875-76.  We 
decline to do so now and therefore will analyze the merits of 
Lark’s claim under the usual three-step burden shifting 
procedure. 
 3. Step 1: The Prima Facie Case 
 The Supreme Court has indicated that in a determination 
of whether a petitioner has established a prima facie case under 
Batson, the prosecutor’s pattern of peremptory strikes is 
significant as are the “prosecutor’s questions and statements 
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during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges . . . 
.”  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.  Further, in 
making Batson determinations “we have identified several 
additional factors, including how many members of the 
cognizable racial group are in the venire panel; the nature of the 
crime; and the race of the defendant and the victim.” Lewis, 581 
F.3d at 103 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Here, though the District Court indicated in its July 3, 
2007 opinion and order that Lark established a prima facie 
Batson violation, it is unclear when, if ever, the Court actually 
made that finding.  In its May 23, 2006 opinion, though the 
Court stated that Lark alleged facts which, if proven true, would 
establish a prima facie case under Batson, it noted that the 
Commonwealth disputed those facts and, indeed, it granted an 
evidentiary hearing, in part, to resolve that dispute.  Lark I, 2006 
WL 1489977, at *9; App. at 42.  Those alleged facts supporting 
the prima facie case included the prosecution’s high strike rate 
of African-American jurors, the absence of any obvious non-
racial basis for the strikes in the voir dire transcripts, and the 
trial prosecutor’s remark (“Oh. How awful”) in response to 
defense counsel’s objection to his pattern of discriminatory 
strikes.  Id. at *8; App. at 41.   
 In its second opinion and order on July 3, 2007, the order 
from which the Commonwealth has appealed, the District Court, 
in a footnote, stated that it previously had found that Lark 
established a prima facie case and cited to its May 23 opinion in 
which it set forth the disputed facts.  Lark II, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 
501 n.10.  But the problem with the Court’s reference is that 
allegations are not findings.  The Court then stated that Lark met 
his step-one burden based on the composition of the venire and 
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the pattern of strikes exercised by the Commonwealth.  Id.   
 The Commonwealth, however, does not challenge that 
Lark has established a prima facie Batson violation.30  We will 
assume that the District Court correctly concluded that Lark met 
his step-one burden based on the composition of the venire and 
the pattern of strikes Carpenter exercised.  Consequently, we 
find it necessary to consider the prosecutor’s step-two 
explanation for the strikes.   
 
 4. Step 2: A Race-Neutral Explanation 
 The Commonwealth argues that Carpenter’s inability to 
explain the reasons for his use of three peremptory challenges at 
                                                 
30 The Commonwealth does argue that Carpenter’s pattern of 
strikes of African-American jurors is not sufficient to prove that 
any single strike was motivated by race.  Appellant’s br. at 50-
51.  Inasmuch as the District Court, at the third step, has a duty 
to determine whether Lark has established that Carpenter 
purposefully discriminated in the exercise of any of his 
peremptory challenges,  we will not address the 
Commonwealth’s argument on this appeal.  After all, it is at the 
third step that the District Court must weigh all the facts and 
circumstances relating to Carpenter’s intent, including the 
pattern of peremptory strikes Carpenter used against African-
American jurors.  See Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he third step of the Batson inquiry requires a 
trial judge to make ‘an ultimate determination on the issue of 
discriminatory intent based on all the facts and 
circumstances.’”).  
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the second step of the Batson analysis was not a sufficient 
ground to grant the conditional writ of habeas corpus because 
that inability along with the other information available to the 
District Court did not enable Lark to satisfy his ultimate burden 
of proving intentional discrimination.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth’s contention. 
 At step two, the Commonwealth has the burden to 
produce a race-neutral explanation but nevertheless the 
opponent of the peremptory strike retains the ultimate burden of 
proof on the Batson issue.  See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 
S.Ct. at 1171 (“[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding 
racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent 
of the strike.”).  The prosecutor’s burden at step two is not high 
as the explanation does not have to be persuasive, or even 
plausible.  Id. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. at 1171.  Consequently, 
inasmuch as the Supreme Court “purposely set a relatively low 
bar at step two,” we have held that it would be rare, but not 
entirely inappropriate, for a court to grant relief at that step.  
Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 257; see also Harrison, 909 F.2d at 88 
(holding that prosecution’s failure to rebut petitioner’s prima 
facie showing of racial discrimination as to one juror dictates the 
grant of a new trial).  But see Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 899 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant bears the ultimate burden 
of proof and therefore step two never can be definitive because 
defendant only has raised an inference of discrimination). 
Here the District Court found that Carpenter’s failure to 
articulate any race-neutral justification for the strikes of three 
jurors mandated that it grant Lark habeas corpus relief.  The first 
juror that Carpenter challenged that we consider is Shirley 
Sampson, an African-American female.  Carpenter could not 
 
 55 
recall why he struck Sampson and reading the transcript did not 
refresh his memory.  Carpenter, however, unequivocally denied 
that he did so because she was African-American.  Before 
proceeding to the next juror, the Commonwealth’s attorney 
asked Carpenter whether where the juror lived could be a 
significant factor in exercising a peremptory strike.  Carpenter 
answered that he did not want a juror who lived too close to the 
defendant or who lived close to the crime scene; however, he 
did not state that he struck Sampson for either of these reasons.   
Similarly, Carpenter could not recall a specific reason for 
striking Florence Williams, an African-American female.  
Carpenter could not find anything “particularly wrong” with 
Williams by looking at the trial transcript (App. at 1044); he did, 
however, state that there were other circumstances that might 
not appear in the transcript, “[f]or example, if I don’t like the 
juror, I think . . . it’s a good bet she doesn’t like me.”  Id. at 
1045.  When the District Court stated that “there could have 
been body language there,” Carpenter responded by saying 
“exactly.”  Id.  The situation was slightly different with respect 
to the third juror, Edison Sisco, an African-American male, even 
though Carpenter could not recall a specific reason for striking 
him.  Carpenter did note that neither he nor defense counsel 
asked Sisco many questions and that Sisco was confused about 
the last school he attended.  Ultimately, however, Carpenter 
stated that he could not recall a reason for exercising a strike to 
remove Sisco. 
 Carpenter’s reasons for striking Sampson, Williams, and 
Sisco were inadequate to meet the Commonwealth’s burden of 
production as explained in Hardcastle.  Carpenter’s statement 
that he might have struck Williams for reasons that did not 
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appear in the transcript is the type of vague explanation we have 
rejected as inadequate to meet the prosecutor’s burden at the 
second Batson step.  Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 258.  Further, 
Carpenter’s unequivocal denial that he struck Sampson because 
of her race standing alone would not be an adequate explanation. 
 See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (stating that a 
prosecutor cannot satisfy burden of production by denying that 
he had discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good 
faith).  Finally, Carpenter did not have an independent 
recollection for striking Sisco. 
 As we indicated above, inasmuch as the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Batson was to a degree retroactive and applies to 
some trials held before Batson, as is the situation here, we have 
considered habeas corpus petitions that have led to proceedings 
at which a prosecutor sought to provide explanations for 
peremptory challenges years after the trial.  In Harrison, the first 
such case we encountered, the prosecutor used six of his eight 
peremptory challenges to strike all of the African-American 
venirepersons and could not recall his reasons for exercising a 
peremptory strike on one of the six African-American jurors he 
excluded during voir dire: “[j]ust looking at these notes, I don’t 
know.  I don’t have her age down here.  The fact that her son is 
a retired police officer, I assume she is an older woman.  That 
could have been a factor; I don’t know.”  909 F.2d at 87.  In 
Harrison we balanced the burden to the state of explaining 
strikes years made earlier against the interests of justice that 
Batson was designed to protect:    
Certain other factors, however, most notably the 
interests of justice, require retroactive application 
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of Batson for cases on direct review even where a 
long period of time occurs in the state court 
appellate process. This is especially true here 
where defense counsel timely objected to the use 
of peremptory challenges, the number of 
peremptory challenges exercised against Blacks 
was so great, the race neutral reasons given for 
striking other black jury venirepersons were so 
weak, and the prosecutor was unable to articulate 
a race neutral reason for striking one of the black 
venirepersons. 
Id. at 87-88.  Ultimately, we held that the prosecution’s failure 
to rebut Harrison’s prima facie showing of racial discrimination 
at the second step mandated the grant of a new trial.  Id. at 88. 
 In Johnson v. Love we held that “the Batson inquiry ends 
and the conviction must be vacated at the second stage of the 
analysis if the state’s explanation is such that, taken at face 
value, it either demonstrates an equal protection violation or 
would otherwise be inadequate as a matter of law to support the 
conviction.”  Love, 40 F.3d at 668 (citations omitted).  In Love, 
the prosecutor’s explanation for striking a young black juror was 
that she would not be sympathetic to the victim of petitioner’s 
crime because the victim solicited sexual favors from young 
black boys prior to his death.  We held that this was not a race-
neutral explanation because the assumption underlying the 
prosecution’s answer was “based on a stereotypical view or 
intuition that black people, because of their race, will relate to 
other black persons in a way that may preclude them from 
basing a verdict solely on the relevant evidence.”  Id.   
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 In Love we also addressed a situation in which a 
prosecutor’s faded memory affects his ability to recall reasons 
for a particular peremptory challenge: 
There will undoubtedly be post-conviction relief 
proceedings in which the state, by reason of 
death, absence, or faded memory, will be unable 
to produce a prosecutor with a specific 
recollection of the reason for a challenge alleged 
to violate Batson. Courts frequently are required 
to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence 
regarding a decision-maker’s state of mind, 
however, and we are unwilling to rule out the 
possibility that the state may be able to satisfy its 
step two Batson burden by tendering 
circumstantial evidence.  In some post-conviction 
relief proceedings, it may well be possible to 
reach a reliable conclusion regarding the true 
reasons for the challenge based upon the nature of 
the case, the transcript of the voir dire of the 
challenged juror and other prospective jurors, 
contemporaneous notes of the attorneys involved, 
and any other available evidence. 
Id. at 667 (emphasis added).  In a footnote, we 
distinguished Harrison by stating that the absence of any 
explanation mandated relief in that case but that Harrison 
does not suggest that a state should not be permitted to 
reconstruct a prosecutor’s rationale for excluding a juror 
when the prosecutor cannot explain his motivation for a 
strike due to his faded memory.  Id. at 667 n.4.   
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 Ten years later, in Hardcastle v. Horn we held that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson when 
it proceeded to the third step of the analysis without finding that 
the Commonwealth at the second step gave an adequate 
justification for the use of peremptory challenges.  368 F.3d at 
259.  In Hardcastle, a case tried before Batson where Batson 
became retroactively applicable on direct appellate review, the 
petitioner’s trial counsel did not raise an objection during voir 
dire but did file a post-voir dire motion under Swain arguing that 
the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes violated the federal 
and state constitutions.  The trial court denied the motion and 
also denied the prosecutor’s request to state her reasons for 
exercising the peremptory strikes.  But an en banc panel of the 
Court of Common Pleas voted to grant a new trial based on the 
jury selection issue.  On the initial appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court reversed the grant of a new trial, finding that 
Hardcastle failed to make the required showing under Swain.  
Id. at 251.   
 On further appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
which heard Hardcastle after the Supreme Court decided Batson, 
conducted its own review of the record and held that the 
prosecutor’s opportunity to observe the jurors during voir dire 
and her decision not to remove two African-American 
venirepersons constituted race-neutral reasons for two 
peremptory strikes.  Thus it determined that Hardcastle failed to 
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s strikes 
violated the equal protection clause.  Id. at 253.  The district 
court granted Hardcastle a writ of habeas corpus, and, on the 
Commonwealth’s appeal, we affirmed, as we found that the 
reasons the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted for the 
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striking of the two African-American jurors did not satisfy the 
Commonwealth’s minimal burden of production at the second 
step inasmuch as the record did not contain any evidence of the 
two jurors’ demeanor or the prosecutor’s observation or 
impressions.  Thus, we found that the Supreme Court’s 
explanation amounted “to nothing more than a statement that the 
prosecutor acted on intuition and with the absence of 
discriminatory intent.”  Id. at 258. 
 In 2005, in Wilson v. Beard there was a Batson challenge 
in a case in which Jack McMahon had been the prosecutor.  The 
district court in the habeas corpus proceedings, in light of the 
fact that 20 years had elapsed between the time of the trial and 
the hearing at which McMahon explained his reasons for 
striking jurors at the trial, concluded that it would have been 
unreasonable to expect McMahon to remember reasons for his 
individual strikes.  426 F.3d at 668.  Rather, the district court 
held that the race-neutral reasons McMahon offered in the 
McMahon tape were sufficient to carry the Commonwealth’s 
burden at the second step.  Inasmuch as we upheld the district 
court’s conclusion that Wilson proved intentional 
discrimination, we did not need to decide whether the district 
court’s ruling with respect to the second step was correct.  
However, we did note that, in light of the passage of time 
between the trial and when McMahon offered his explanation 
for striking jurors, the district court appropriately lessened the 
Commonwealth’s burden of production at the second step.  Id.  
 Though, so far as we can ascertain, the United States 
Supreme Court never has addressed whether it is appropriate for 
a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus at the second step 
because a prosecutor could not recall the reason for a 
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peremptory challenge many years after the trial, recent 
precedent suggests that courts should be reluctant to do so for 
they should act with caution before granting relief at that step of 
the Batson process and our own consideration of the issue leads 
us to reach the same conclusion.  For example, in Purkett v. 
Elem the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in a step-two 
analysis, concluded that the prosecutor’s explanation that he 
used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror because the juror 
had long unkempt hair and suspicious facial hair was pretextual 
and was not a legitimate race-neutral reason for striking the 
juror.  514 U.S. at 766-67, 115 S.Ct. at 1770.  But on further 
appeal the Supreme Court, reiterating that the burden never 
shifts from the defendant in a Batson dispute, held that the court 
of appeals improperly conflated the second and third Batson 
steps: 
[i]t is not until the third step that the 
persuasiveness of the justification becomes 
relevant-the step in which the trial court 
determines whether the opponent of the strike has 
carried his burden of proving purposeful 
discrimination.  At that stage, implausible or 
fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be 
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. 
 But to say that a trial judge may choose to 
disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step 
three is quite different from saying that a trial 
judge must terminate the inquiry at step two when 
the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious.  
The latter violates the principle that the ultimate 
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation 
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rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of 
the strike. 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (internal citations 
omitted).  The Supreme Court also stated that the requirement in 
Batson that a prosecutor “must give a ‘clear and reasonably 
specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising 
the challenges” only “was meant to refute the notion that a 
prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely 
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely 
affirming his good faith. . . . [A] ‘legitimate reason’ is not a 
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal 
protection.”  Id., 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 
98, n.20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.20.).   
 More recently, the Supreme Court discussed a second-
step issue in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 
2410 (2005).  California law required an objector, in order to 
establish a prima facie Batson case, to show that it was more 
likely than not that the other party’s peremptory challenges, if 
unexplained, were based on impermissible bias.  Id. at 168, 125 
S.Ct. at 2416.  The respondents, defending the California law, 
contended that a Batson claimant must prove discrimination by a 
preponderance of the evidence at the first step or else “a 
prosecutor’s failure to respond to a prima facie case would 
inexplicably entitle a defendant to judgment as a matter of law 
on the basis of nothing more than an inference that 
discrimination may have occurred.”  Id. at 170, 125 S.Ct. at 
2417.  The Court held that this standard was too onerous and not 
a proper application of Batson because the first two steps in the 
Batson process govern only the production of evidence and the 
defendant ultimately retains the burden to prove the existence of 
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purposeful discrimination.  The Court also reiterated Purkett’s 
holding that even if the state produces “frivolous or utterly 
nonsensical justifications for its strike,” the analysis moves to 
step three.  Id. at 171, 125 S.Ct. at 2417.  Then, in a footnote, the 
Court added: 
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the 
prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge’s 
inquiry regarding his justification for making a 
strike, the evidence before the judge would 
consist not only of the original facts from which 
the prima facie case was established, but also the 
prosecutor’s refusal to justify his strike in light of 
the court’s request. Such a refusal would provide 
additional support for the inference of 
discrimination raised by a defendant’s prima facie 
case.  Cf. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. 
Comm’r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 111, 47 S. 
Ct. 302, 71 L. Ed. 560 (1927). 
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 n.6, 125 S.Ct. at 2417 n.6.   
 While obviously intended to apply to an objection made 
during voir dire, the Johnson footnote indicates that the 
prosecutor’s lack of response is evidence to be taken into 
account only at step three and is not, by itself, of such 
dispositive force that it establishes that there was a Batson 
violation.  Following that line of reasoning this case presents a 
more compelling argument for proceeding to the third step of the 
inquiry.  The District Court’s holding that the Batson inquiry 
ends if the state fails to meet its duty of production is accurate 
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only if the prosecution, at step two, demonstrates that it based its 
challenge on a reason that was an equal protection violation.  
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; see also Hernandez 
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991) 
(plurality opinion) (“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in 
the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed 
race neutral.”).   
 Unlike the Supreme Court’s hypothetical prosecutor in 
Johnson, Carpenter’s “silence” was a product of his failure to 
recall specific reasons for his three peremptory strikes.  
Carpenter’s inability to recall his reasons for exercising 
peremptory strikes 21 years after the trial surely is far less 
suggestive that at the trial there had been purposeful 
discrimination than a prosecutor’s outright refusal to answer the 
trial court’s inquiry at voir dire directly after the prosecutor 
exercised the peremptory challenge.  After all, when at a trial the 
prosecutor is asked to explain the reasons for his challenge they 
should be fresh in his mind.  Further, it would be anomalous to 
hold that “an utterly nonsensical”  reason would have satisfied 
the Commonwealth’s burden of production at step two of the 
Batson process, as it could have done, but that Carpenter’s 
failure to recall race-neutral reasons, or any reasons for strikes, 
21 years after the trial automatically should result in a finding 
that his strikes were the product of discriminatory intent.  
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171, 125 S.Ct. at 2417.   
 More importantly, the Supreme Court in Johnson rejected 
the argument that a prosecutor’s failure to respond to a prima 
facie case “would inexplicably entitle a defendant to judgment 
as a matter of law on the basis of nothing more than an inference 
that discrimination may have occurred.”  Id. at 170, 125 S.Ct. at 
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2417.  Instead, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that 
Batson’s burden-shifting framework is simply a means of 
presenting evidence.  The Court compared the Batson 
framework to the burden-shifting found in Title VII employment 
discrimination cases.31  Id. at 171 n.7, 125 S.Ct. at 2418 n.7 
(citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-510 & 
n.3, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748 & n.3 (1993) (holding that 
determinations at steps one and two of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework “can involve no credibility assessment” because “the 
burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the 
credibility-assessment stage,” and that the burden-shifting 
framework triggered by a plaintiff’s prima facie case is 
essentially just “a means of ‘arranging the presentation of 
evidence’”)).  In a Title VII case, even if the defendant fails to 
introduce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse 
employment action, it still can avoid liability if the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case “is held to be inadequate in law or fails to 
convince the factfinder.”  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510 
n.3, 113 S.Ct. at 2748 n.3.   
                                                 
31 The Supreme Court established the three-step employment 
discrimination framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973).  Under that burden-
shifting framework, the plaintiff first has to make out a prima 
facie case of discrimination at which point the burden shifts to 
the employer to present a nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action and, finally, the employee has to 
demonstrate that the reason the employer gives is pretextual.  
Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 78 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  
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Here, the District Court clearly erred when it ended the 
Batson analysis at the second step of the three-step analysis even 
though, as we have indicated, Carpenter’s reasons for striking 
Sampson, Williams, and Sisco were inadequate to meet the 
Commonwealth’s burden of production as we explained the 
burden in Hardcastle.  First, though Carpenter failed to recall the 
reasons for exercising three peremptory strikes to remove 
African-American jurors, Lark’s prima facie case was not as 
strong as the petitioner’s prima facie case was in Harrison.  In 
contrast to the prosecutor in Harrison who struck all the African-
Americans from the jury, Carpenter did not strike four African-
Americans and had five peremptory strikes remaining at the end 
of voir dire.  See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 509 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“Another factor that makes the government’s 
race-neutral explanation more believable is that one Hispanic 
and three African Americans were seated in the final jury, and 
the government had three peremptory strikes remaining.”). 32  
Nor was this a case, as was Hardcastle, where a state court 
attempted to fashion race-neutral explanations without holding 
an evidentiary hearing to give the prosecutor a chance to explain 
the reasons behind the peremptory strikes.  368 F.3d at 252.  
Rather, Carpenter’s memory loss, understandable considering 
                                                 
32 Of course, it has not escaped our attention that the 
composition of Lark’s jury--four African-Americans and eight 
Caucasians--is described on the McMahon tape as the ideal jury. 
 We also note, however, that the District Court made a factual 
finding after the evidentiary hearing that, although Carpenter 
knew McMahon, McMahon never was his senior or supervisor 
in the District Attorney’s Office and never instructed Carpenter 
on how to select a jury.  Lark II, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 494. 
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the 21-year gap between the challenges and the evidentiary 
hearing, prevented him from offering direct reasons behind the 
exercise of his peremptory challenges.     
  In addition, the District Court found that Carpenter was 
not systematic in his note taking and that the only notes he took 
were symbols and notations he made by each juror’s name on 
the jury list.  495 F. Supp. 2d at 495.  The notes were incomplete 
inasmuch as two of the jurors whom Carpenter could not recall 
striking do not appear on the juror sheets on which Carpenter 
took his notes.  The other contemporaneous evidence of 
Carpenter’s state of mind is his response of “Oh. How awful” to 
Rogers’ complaint that he was striking all African-Americans 
from the panel.  Carpenter explained that he was being sarcastic 
because he recognized that Rogers was attempting to raise race 
as an issue.  Carpenter further testified that he used sarcasm at 
other points in the trial when he became frustrated with Rogers’ 
tactics.  It is not clear whether the Court believed that 
Carpenter’s explanation of his comment was credible.  
 There were, moreover, compelling reasons for the Court 
to advance to the third step of the Batson analysis.  To start with, 
the Supreme Court has suggested that Batson’s burden shifting 
framework is a means to present evidence and thus the 
prosecution’s presentation of only thin evidence at the second 
step, though perhaps damaging to its case, is not dispositive on 
the question of discriminatory intent.  Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170-
71, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18.  Proceeding to the third step would 
have allowed the District Court to judge whether Carpenter’s 
strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause  through juror 
comparisons, thus fulfilling the principal goal of Batson: “to 
produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that 
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discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.”  
Id. at 172, 125 S.Ct. at 2418.   
 The District Court’s acceptance of Lark’s prima facie 
case as dispositive proof of Carpenter’s intent substituted 
inferences for an actual answer to the question of whether 
Carpenter discriminated in the selection of jurors.  We hold that 
the District Court, by moving to the third step, could have 
weighed all of the evidence against Lark’s prima facie case.   
Instead, the District Court’s approach validated the fears of the 
respondents in Johnson: the prosecutor did not come forward 
with evidence at the second step and Lark received “judgment as 
a matter of law on the basis of nothing more than an inference 
that discrimination may have occurred.”  Id. at 170, 125 S.Ct. at 
2417.   
Moreover, this case presents an unusual situation in 
which neither party may be held culpable for the delay in the 
adjudication of the Batson claim.  Nevertheless, we see some 
merit to the Commonwealth’s contention that Lark should have 
been more diligent in pursuing the claim even though, as our 
discussion of procedural default demonstrates, Pennsylvania’s 
“relaxed waiver” policy created a post-conviction climate in 
which the state courts would waive procedural rules in capital 
cases.  After all, following the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 
affirmance of his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, Lark 
did not file any further proceedings for six years in state or 
federal court seeking relief even though his life literally was at 
stake.  Furthermore, we do not fault the Commonwealth courts 
for enforcing their procedural rules to deny Lark an evidentiary 
hearing.  As we noted in Hardcastle, “while the retroactive 
application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson undeniably 
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causes many problems, we do not believe the weight of this 
burden should be borne solely by the Commonwealth.”  368 
F.3d at 261.  By terminating its Batson analysis at the second 
step, the District Court shifted the entire consequences of 
Carpenter’s memory loss to the Commonwealth, and thus 
allowed Lark to obtain a writ of habeas corpus by showing only 
a prima facie case of discrimination. 
Finally, we have indicated that it is appropriate to lessen 
the state’s burden at the second step where the passage of time 
diminishes the prosecutor’s recollection of voir dire.  Wilson, 
426 F.3d at 668.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s limitation of the 
retroactive application of Batson to cases on direct appeal when 
it decided that case and not applying its holding to cases on 
collateral review at the time of that decision, indicates that the 
Court envisioned problems such as those present here in 
applying Batson years after the trial.  We think that proceeding 
to the third step of the Batson analysis is preferable to the 
alternative: overturning a 25-year-old jury verdict which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld against numerous 
challenges and which seems to have been predicated on 
substantial evidence merely because it would be possible to 
draw an inference of discrimination in jury selection. 
We hold that given the recent Supreme Court case law 
and the particular circumstances of this case, the District Court 
should have proceeded to the third step of the Batson analysis.    
        
V. CONCLUSION 
 Inasmuch as we have determined that the District Court 
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improperly applied Batson, we will vacate its order, remand the 
case to the District Court, and direct that the Court perform the 
third step of the Batson analysis.33  Both parties make arguments 
regarding the McMahon tape’s relevance and the Baldus study’s 
reliability.  However, inasmuch as the District Court explicitly 
declined to consider these issues, see Lark II, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 
503 n.12, we do not address them on this appeal, though they 
may become significant on the remand. 
 The District Court based its decision on the pattern of the 
prosecutor’s strikes and Carpenter’s inability to articulate a 
justification for three of those strikes.  Any other evidence or 
arguments which relate to intentional discrimination, such as 
juror comparisons, properly are made at the third Batson step 
and we will not consider them at this time.  Miller-El, 545 U.S. 
at 241, 125 S.Ct. at 2325 (“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for 
striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-
similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence 
tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at 
Batson’s third step.”).  Ultimately, it is at the third step that the 
District Court must make a finding regarding the prosecutor’s 
motivation in exercising the challenged strikes.  See Bond v. 
Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the District 
Court’s order entered on July 5, 2007, granting Lark a 
                                                 
33 Of course,  if on the remand the District Court rejects Lark’s 
Batson contention, it should consider the other contentions that 
he advanced but that the Court had no need to address.  Some of 
these contentions likely will involve complex jurisdictional, 
procedural, and substantive questions. 
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conditional writ of habeas corpus, and remand the case for the 
further proceedings that we have indicated in this opinion are 
required.  No costs shall be allowed on this appeal. 
 
 
 Lark v. Beard, 07-9004 
McKee, Chief Circuit Judge, concurring 
 I join the majority opinion in its entirety, and fully 
agree with the remand to the District Court to complete the 
third step of the Batson analysis.  However, I write separately 
to emphasize that although my colleagues note that “we have 
indicated that it is appropriate to lessen the state’s burden at 
the second step where the passage of time diminishes the 
prosecutor’s recollection of voir dire,” Maj. Op. 58 (citing 
Wilson, 426 F.3d at 668), we have not done so here.  The 
majority properly concludes that the Commonwealth failed to 
meet its burden at step two of the Batson analysis because the 
prosecutor failed to offer race-neutral reasons for striking 
three jurors.  Thus, in this case, the majority’s discussion of 
the appropriateness of lessening the state’s burden of 
production when the prosecutor has a faded memory at step 
two of the Batson analysis is purely dicta, and rightfully so.   
In Wilson, we stated: “[I]n light of the passage of time, 
we agree with the District Court that it was appropriate to 
lessen the burden of the Commonwealth at step two.” 426 
F.3d at 668.  However, in Wilson, unlike here, it does not 
appear that a timely objection was made at trial to the 
prosecutor’s discriminatory exercise of peremptory strikes.  
See Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 280 n.3.  As the majority quite 
correctly notes, Lark’s attorney raised what was to become a 
Batson claim during voir dire.  Accordingly, the prosecutor 
was immediately put on notice that he may later have to 
explain his motivations in peremptorily striking Black jurors.   
The majority suggests that the prosecutor’s burden 
must necessarily be reduced at step two when the prosecutor’s 
faded memory results from a long passage of time between 
voir dire and a Batson hearing.  However, that principle 
should not apply when, as here, a timely objection is made to 
the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes.  Under such 
circumstances, the fact finder may conclude that the claim of 
faded memory and  failure to memorialize the reasons for 
certain strikes is less credible than might otherwise be the 
case.  I do not suggest that this necessarily undermines a 
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subsequent claim of failed memory.  However, I also do not 
think it appropriate to suggest that the claim of failed memory 
must receive the same credibility and consideration afforded 
the prosecutor in Wilson.  Rather, the District Court must be 
free to assess the credibility of the claim of failed memory 
during its step three Batson analysis on remand. 
On remand, the District Court will have to decide 
whether, and to what extent, the prosecutor’s subsequent 
claim of failed memory should be credited given the very 
unique circumstances here and the fact that he was 
immediately informed that his motivations may be examined 
at a later date.   
